News
05 FEB - Executives of charter jet company indicted, charged in connection with 2005 Tete 11 FEB - RNF Iceland: fatigue factor in B 737-800 runway excursion at Keflavik
12 FEB - FAA Emergency Order of Suspension shuts down AAR landing gear station
12 FEB - ANSV Italy investigates serious runway incursion incident at Rome-Fiumicino
12 FEB - UK AAIB releases report on F-27 ground accident
13 FEB - Australian Government moves to strengthen safety oversight of airlines
13 FEB - AAIU finds electric wiring problems in A340 fire incident investigation
18 FEB - AD on Learjet 55 (lavatory light assembly fire hazard)
19 FEB - Italian investigation into fatal Citation crash frustrated by juducial inquiry
20 FEB - U.K. AAIB issues safety recommendations on EMB-190 interphone system use
23 FEB - Indonesia: Prosecutors seek four-year jail term for Garuda pilot
24 FEB - BEA releases interim report on Airbus A320 loss of control accident near Perpign
27 FEB - Dutch Safety Board refuses Public Prosecutor access to CVR/FDR data
05 FEB 2009 Executives of charter jet company indicted, charged in connection with 2005 Tete [to table of contents]
Five company officials and a pilot associated with Platinum Jet Management, LLC were named in a 23-count Indictment charging a series of crimes, including endangering the safety of aircraft.
The Indictment alleges a conspiracy to commit continuous willful violations of regulatory requirements for the operation of commercial charter aircraft. The Indictment also accuses the defendants of routinely undertaking and concealing dangerous fueling and weight distribution practices which existed on the Platinum-operated jet that failed to lift off at Teterboro on Feb. 2, 2005. The jet left the end of the runway, crossed Route 46, hitting cars along the way, and slammed through the side of a clothing warehouse.
The Teterboro flight that crashed on Feb. 2, 2005, was over-fueled in a manner that caused the plane’s center of gravity to exceed its forward weight limit for takeoff, contributing to the crash, according to the Indictment. The fueling practice was commonly used, according to the Indictment, to increase profits for Platinum Jet.
According to the Indictment, from November 2002 until November 2003, the conspirators operated Platinum Jet as an on-demand commercial jet charter company without having a Part 135 certificate, which is required by federal aviation regulations for charter operations. During this period, the conspirators lied in contractual documents faxed from state to state to charter brokers about Platinum Jet’s illegal regulatory and safety status. The Indictment claims that the defendants operated more than 85 commercial flights during this period in violation of federal safety regulations for more than $1 million in compensation.
The Indictment further alleges that, in November 2003, the conspirators started sharing a Part 135 certificate, or "piggybacking," with a Part 135 certificate holder based in Alabama, and that after they did so, they continued to violate FAA rules by dispatching unqualified pilots and pilots without the FAA-required amount of rest to fly chartered flights. To conceal this illegality, the Indictment alleges, Platinum Jet pilots signed FAA mandated flight logs for more than 30 charter-brokered flights falsely indicating that those charters were private, non-profit flights, which are subject to less onerous regulation than commercial flights. This alleged conduct lasted from November 2003 until shortly after the crash at Teterboro Airport in February 2005. (The United States Attorney's Office District of New Jersey)
Platinum Jet Indictment (.pdf)
The Icelandic Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (RNF) released their final investigation report regarding the serious incident involving a Boeing 737-800 at Keflavík, Iceland. The airplane operated a subcharter fight from Antalya, Turkey to Iceland. The flight crew made an unscheduled fuel stop in Edinburgh before continuing on the last leg to Keflavik. An approach was set up for runway 02 at Keflavik International Airport. The aircraft contacted the runway and then bounced up into the air again before full runway contact was made with the main landing gear tires followed by the nose landing gear tire. The aircraft was not decelerated enough when nearing the runway end so the pilot flying attempted to turn the aircraft onto taxiway November at the end of the runway. The aircraft skidded off the taxiway and came to rest parallel to the taxiway with the nose landing gear and the right main landing gear off the paved surface. It was amongst others concluded that the flight crew was likely fatigued and this had a degrading effect on their performance. The rest facilities and cockpit environments were less than optimal for sleep and decreased the likelihood that rest periods would help to reduce the risk of fatigue related errors. On approach, the information on the runway and taxiway conditions the pilot flying received led him to expect that no extra precautions would be necessary during the landing. Upon landing there was absence or very little flare before touchdown which resulted in a hard bounced landing. The pilot flying did not use reverse thrust and braking to its maximum effectiveness and applied brake pressure late. (RNF)
M-03707/AIG-19
12 FEB 2009 FAA Emergency Order of Suspension shuts down AAR landing gear station [to table of contents] AAR Corp. announced that on Tuesday, February 10, 2009, AAR Landing Gear Services received an Emergency Order of Suspension from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Southern Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, temporarily suspending the repair station certificate for its Landing Gear Services repair station in Miami, Florida. The FAA carried out facility inspections in early July 2008. On July 16, 2008, the FAA issued a written notice of alleged discrepancies, to which AAR responded with corrective actions on July 29, 2008. On November 7, 2008, AAR met with FAA representatives to discuss its responses and corrective actions. On January 30, 2009 AAR received a follow-up letter from the FAA identifying items that required further attention. AAR says it was in the process of responding to that request when it received the order of suspension. AAR reports "During this period, [AAR] engaged consultants, including FAA Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs), to review its manuals, policies and procedures to confirm compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). Additionally, during this period, the Company implemented an enhanced quality assurance function that exceeds current regulatory requirements and successfully submitted to and passed 25 quality and process audits by customers, including the Department of Defense." (AAR)
press release
12 FEB 2009 ANSV Italy investigates serious runway incursion incident at Rome-Fiumicino [to table of contents] The Italian Air Safety Board (ANSV) reported that they opened the investigation into a serious runway incursion incident that happened on January 9, 2009 at Rome Fiumicino Airport. Thai Airways International Boeing 747-400 HS-TGZ (Flight TG945 to Bangkok) was taxiing to runway 16R for departure. It crossed runway 07 threshold just as an Airbus A319 was taking off runway 25. The A319 crew aborted tha takeoff. (ANSV)
news release
12 FEB 2009 UK AAIB releases report on F-27 ground accident [to table of contents] The UK Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) released their final investigation report regarding the accident involving a Fokker F-27-500 at Edinburgh-Turnhouse Airport (EDI), UK in February 2008. The aircraft moved forward inadvertently after engine start, causing its right propeller to strike a GPU. Possible explanations include that the parking brake was not set, the chocks had slipped from the nosewheel, or the chocks were removed prematurely. There was insufficient evidence to determine which of these scenarios was the most likely. Contributory factors were: the aircraft was facing down a slight downslope, the ramp was slippery due to the weather conditions and the flight crew increased engine speed to top up the pneumatic system pressure. The airport operator’s instructions contained in MDD 04/07 required aircraft facing nose-out on North Cargo Apron stands to be towed onto the taxiway centreline, prior to starting engines. Had these instructions been complied with, the accident would probably have been avoided. (AAIB)
AAIB Bulletin: 2/2009
13 FEB 2009 Australian Government moves to strengthen safety oversight of airlines [to table of contents] The Australian Ministry for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government introduced new legislation that will strengthen the nation's two key aviation safety agencies and their oversight of the airlines. The Civil Aviation Amendment Bill will create a small expert Board of five members for CASA - Australia's independent aviation safety regulator. The new Board will include CASA's Director of Aviation Safety and provide high-level direction to the organisation's regulatory and safety oversight role. The legislation also: * Improves CASA's ability to oversight foreign carriers flying into Australia; * Strengthens the provisions for preventing operators from continuing to operate services where CASA considers it unsafe for them to continue; and * Closes a gap in the current legislation by introducing an additional offence of negligently carrying or consigning dangerous goods on an aircraft. Transport Safety Investigation Amendment Bill seeks to reinforce the independence of the ATSB by establishing it as a separate statutory agency with a full-time Chief Commissioner and two part-time Commissioners. The legislation also gives the ATSB new powers to compel agencies and operators within the aviation industry to respond to its formal recommendations within 90 days, giving the public greater confidence that the lessons from past accidents will be acted upon in a timely manner. (Ministry for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government )
media release
13 FEB 2009 AAIU finds electric wiring problems in A340 fire incident investigation [to table of contents] Irish air accident investigators released a preliminary report regarding an incident involving a Virgin Atlantic Airbus A340 en route from Heathrow to Chicago in January 2009. A small fire broke out in the bottom of the waste bin storage compartment of the bar unit in the First Class area. The fire was located in a hole in the floor of the compartment. The crew noted that a damaged electric cable loom appeared to emanate from this hole. Arcing was observed in the hole. Crew members used fire extinguishers but they could not put the blaze out. An emergency landing was carried out at Shannon. The Investigation found that the cable loom in the bottom of the waste bin compartment had been completely severed and bore strong evidence of burning/arcing. The loom in question consists of ten wires in a protective sheath, six wires carrying 28 V DC and the other four carrying 115 V AC. This wiring provided power and dimming circuits for “mood” lighting which is recessed into the bar unit counter-top. Initial indication was that the lower edge of the metal waste bin made contact with the wiring loom. Information from drawings provided by the Operator indicated that two runners should be installed in the bottom of the compartment to keep the bin above the wiring loom, thereby avoiding contact. Furthermore, a protective metal cover should be installed over the loom in the bottom of the compartment. No evidence of the presence of the loom cover or rails was found. Initial inspection indicated the possibility that they were never fitted. A fleet inspection of the Operator’s A340-300 and A340-600 (which have a similar bar unit fitted but a different part number) aircraft found that a number of these aircraft also had problems relating to missing covers, rail screws and cable routing in this area. Damage to the loom was found on one other aircraft. (AAIU)
AAIU Report No: 2009-005
18 FEB 2009 AD on Learjet 55 (lavatory light assembly fire hazard) [to table of contents] The U.S. FAA adopted a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Learjet Model 55, 55B, and 55C airplanes. The AD requires inspecting the installation of the forward light assembly in the aft lavatory to determine the location of the terminal connector; inspecting for damage of the light assembly terminals, wires, and oxygen lines; inspecting to determine if the cable nipple is installed over the light assembly terminal; and doing corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires installing a clamp to the forward side of the frame to maintain a positive distance between the light assembly and oxygen line. This AD results from a report of a cabin fire in the left-hand upper cabin fuselage above the aft cabin window at frame 23. The AD is issued to detect and correct improper installation of the lavatory light assembly, which could result in contact between the electrical terminals of the light assembly and an adjacent oxygen supply line, and consequent short circuit or fire hazard. (FAA)
AD 2009-03-01
19 FEB 2009 Italian investigation into fatal Citation crash frustrated by juducial inquiry [to table of contents] The Italian aircraft accident investigation board ANSV (Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo) reports that they are not able to conduct a thorough investigation into the fatal accident involving a Cessna 650 Citation III near Rome on February 7, 2009. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) were seized for a juducial inquiry. ANSV also had to turn over documents vital to the investigation. Present regulations in Italy give primacy to the investigation of the prosecutor, whose work takes precedence over ANSV investigations. ANSV complained about the effects of these potential conflicts between criminal and technical investigation and asked the ministers of Transport and Justice to change legislation. (ANSV)
ANSV news release
20 FEB 2009 U.K. AAIB issues safety recommendations on EMB-190 interphone system use [to table of contents] The U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) published recommendations following an incident involving an Embraer 190 on January 15, 2008. During flight, "smoke" was seen to emanate from a galley sink and the flight deck and cabin crews took appropriate emergency action. In the course of the 'Electrical System Fire or Smoke' procedure the flight crew established the aircraft on emergency power, after which communications between the flight deck and cabin became difficult. The aircraft landed safely. Deficiencies in the interphone system were identified, and four safety recommendations are made. Safety Recommendation 2009-017: It is recommended that Embraer immediately notify all operators, of the Embraer 190 family of aircraft, to inform flight crew of the importance of advising cabin crew when an aircraft is on emergency electrical power. Safety Recommendation 2009-018: It is recommended that Embraer immediately notify all operators, of the Embraer 190 family of aircraft, to inform their flight and cabin crew of the functioning of the interphone system when the aircraft is supplied only with emergency electrical power. Safety Recommendation 2009-019: It is recommended that Embraer modify the functioning of the interphone systems of Embraer 190 family aircraft to provide crew with the facility to make both normal and emergency calls when the aircraft is supplied only with emergency electrical power. Safety Recommendation 2009-020: It is recommended that Embraer immediately notify all operators, of the Embraer 190 family of aircraft, to inform flight and cabin crew of the functioning of the flight deck access system when the aircraft is supplied only with emergency electrical power. (AAIB)
AAIB Special Bulletin: 1/2009
23 FEB 2009 Indonesia: Prosecutors seek four-year jail term for Garuda pilot [to table of contents] Indonesian Distict Court Prosecutors in Sleman have called for a Garuda pilot to be sentenced four years in jail for his negligence in the accident of a Boeing 737-400 at Yogyakarta in 2007. Twenty-one passengers were killed in the accident. During the court session prosecutor Modim Aristo said that the defendant had violated article 479 G, points A and B, of the Criminal Code. (The Jakarta Post) 24 FEB 2009 BEA releases interim report on Airbus A320 loss of control accident near Perpign [to table of contents]
The BEA (France) has published an Interim Report in the context of its investigation into the accident that occurred off the coast of Canet-Plage on 27 November 2008 to the Airbus A320 registered D-AXLA. The airplane, operated by XL Airways Germany, was performing a non-revenue flight that departed from Perpignan-Rivesaltes aerodrome. This flight, planned in the leasing agreement, included a programme of checks to be performed before the return of the airplane to Air New Zealand. The report shows, specifically, that since the flight was shortened, a check at low speed planned at altitude was undertaken during the approach to Perpignan. It was during this check that the crew lost control of the airplane, which crashed into the sea. The interim report contains a recommendation to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) aimed at reinforcing the regulatory requirements related to the preparation and execution of non-revenue flights. The investigation in fact showed that in the almost complete absence of indications or standards, a wide variety of descriptions by operators of these flights was found, both in their performance and in the selection and training of pilots. (BEA)
d-la081127ea
27 FEB 2009 Dutch Safety Board refuses Public Prosecutor access to CVR/FDR data [to table of contents] The Dutch Safety Board denied requests by the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie) for access to CVR/FDR readout data of Turkish Airlines flight TK1951. The Turkish Airlines Boeing 737 crashed on approach to Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport. Safety Board officials feel witnesses will not be able to speak freely if they feel their statements could be used in a criminal investigation. (Openbaar Ministerie, AD)
Openbaar Ministerie news release
